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Supervising Secrecy: Preventing Abuses 
Within Bank Secrecy and Financial Privacy 
Systems 
INTRODUCTION 
At the tender age of 16, Jacob Friedman travelled alone to Zurich, 
smuggling his father's earnings from the runaway inflation of Romania 
to the safety of the Swiss banking system. l Jacob's father believed that 
the Swiss franc was stable and that his numbered account was protected 
from disclosure to civil authorities. 2 Jacob was the only member of his 
family to escape Auschwitz. 3 In the 1970s, he travelled from his new 
home in New York to Zurich in search of his father's life savings.4 The 
Swiss banks told him that if he could not remember the secret account 
number, the account would not be released to him.5 
Estelle Sapir's father was a wealthy investment banker from Warsaw 
who often deposited large sums with Credit Suisse.6 Like Jacob and 
millions of others, Estelle lost her entire family in the Holocaust. 7 In 
1947, Estelle travelled to Geneva carrying with her a deposit slip from 
1938.8 When she arrived at the main branch of Credit Suisse, the 
bankers told her that without a death certificate they would not release 
her father's bank account.9 Even though she told the bankers that Nazi 
Germany did not issue death certificates after they killed people in gas 
chambers, the bankers remained adamant: without proof that her 
father was dead, the bank would keep the money. 10 Jacob and Estelle 
1 See Sean MacCarthaigh, Swiss Held to Account, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See MacCarthaigh, supra note 1; see also Newshour: Breaking the Code (PBS television broadcast, 
Nov. 19, 1996), <http://wwwl.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/november96/swiss_accounts_ 11-
19.html> [hereinafter Breaking the Code]. 
7 See Breaking the Code, supra note 6. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
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have joined almost 10,000 others in a class action suit on behalf of 
American individuals seeking answers surrounding these long dormant 
accounts. ll 
Immediately following World War II and the Holocaust, people and 
nations commenced a process of returning their lives to order. Survi-
vors began the search for lost loved ones and lost assets that had been 
seized by Nazi Germany to finance its war effort. For some assets the 
task was easy: everyone knew that the Mona Lisa belonged to the 
Louvre and it would be impossible to ferret away such a recognizable 
paintingY But for many survivors and their families, their entire lives 
were bound in a single bookkeeping entry in a bank, and that bank 
would not come forth with information. By 1996, allegations against 
the Swiss banking industry had reached a fever pitch. 13 Decades of 
research into missing assets had culminated in thousands of claims that 
Swiss banks were withholding millions of stolen or dormant accounts 
from their rightful owners and heirs.14 
In a different system, these claims could be evaluated quickly by a 
review of bank records. 15 But the banks in question are Swiss, and 
under Swiss law, bank records are not turned over to anyone regardless 
of the allegations made. 16 In this instance, Switzerland was not about 
to grant full access to the claimants. 17 
This refusal, approved by the Swiss government, sparked renewed 
questions concerning the appropriateness of bank secrecy laws.18 In 
this instance, the same laws that were enacted to provide protection to 
individuals against the seizure of assets by the Nazi Gestapo were now 
being used against these same individuals to deny them answers to long 
unresolved questions. 19 
II See MacCarthaigh, supra note 1. 
12 The ownership of artwork and artifacts is maintained in the work's provenance. The prove-
nance of a particular piece is, by virtue of scholars and attention to collecting, effectively a matter 
of public record; thus, the withholding of ownership information by one entity may have little or 
no effect on reparation efforts. 
J3 See Marcus Kabel, Swiss Hit Back at Dl1mato's Holocaust Charges, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Nov. 
8, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Swiss Hit Back]. 
14 See Marcus Kabel, Swiss Banks Greet U.S. List of Holocaust Accounts, REUTERS EUR. Bus. REp., 
Oct. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Swiss Banks Greet]. 
15 See infra notes 105-35 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 82-104 and accompanying text. 
17 See Swiss See No Need for New Wartime Probe by Jews, REUTERS WORLD SERV., Jan. 21, 1997, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
18 See infra notes 19-29 and accompanying text. 
19 See Newshour: Accounts Due (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 11, 1996) (statement of Senator 
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This Note will discuss the nature of the allegations made against 
Switzerland and the actions of the Swiss banks both during and after 
World War II. The alleged conduct will be reviewed in the context 
of international human rights standards and developing theories of 
crimes against humanity. Further, this Note, using the Swiss system as 
a model, will offer potential solutions to the inherent problems of bank 
secrecy laws in general. Part I examines the allegations that have been 
made against Switzerland and the efforts that have been undertaken 
to solve this crisis. Part II will seek to outline the causes for the 
allegations against the Swiss banks, focusing on the evolution and 
doctrine of bank secrecy and financial privacy laws. Part III details the 
traditional methods of overcoming bank secrecy laws, focusing on the 
treatment of financial privacy in the United States and the cooperation 
and procedures that have arisen for circumventing secrecy laws. Part 
IV proposes allowing the relaxation of financial privacy laws in in-
stances of universal human rights violations and crimes against human-
ity. Part V analyzes the inherent problems of bank secrecy with regards 
to maintaining the protection of customer rights and the integrity of 
the banking system. Part VI proposes the possibility of maintaining an 
oversight committee, by establishing a new committee and expanding 
the authority of an existing body, to serve as a point of redress and 
arbiter of discovery disputes and to establish and maintain general 
supervising standards. The Note concludes that while banking secrecy 
does not need to be eliminated, the international banking community 
must establish feasible and responsive methods for individuals seeking 
access to financial records. 
1. THE ALLEGATIONS 
The evidence uncovered to date points to active and systematic Swiss 
collaboration with the Third Reich.20 There are three parts to the Swiss 
problem. First, several hundred tons of gold bullion were accepted 
from Hitler's central bank in exchange for Swiss francs. 21 These "neu-
tral" francs were then used to purchase, among other items, steel from 
D'Amato) <http://wwwl.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/ december96/ swiss_12-II.html> [here-
inafter Accounts Due]; Cathryn J. Prince, Gold Rush on Swiss Banks: Story of Nazi Loot Unfolds, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 27, 1996, at 8 (Bus. & Mon. Sec.). 
20 See MacCarthaigh, supra note l. Other allegations of collusion levied against the Swiss include 
the creation of the notorious 'Jew stamp" for passports and allowing German forces and weapons 
shortcuts by train through the Alps. See id. 
21 See id. 
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Switzerland and Sweden, and tungsten from Portugal.22 Second, the 
accounts held by Jewish individuals were either seized by the Third 
Reich in contravention of the Swiss secrecy laws or new Third Reich 
accounts were funded with assets seized from the conquered territo-
ries.23 Lastly, the banks have refused all access to dormant accounts, 
claiming the tenets of Swiss law and banking practice prohibit such 
disclosure.24 
A. Reactions Immediately Following the End of World War II 
In 1939, Europe's central bankers and Swiss officials reportedly knew 
exactly how much gold Germany had in reserves.25 By 1945, the Swiss 
had bought vast sums of bullion from the Nazis, without stopping to 
question from where the surplus was coming.26 Historians now believe 
that the extra gold was plundered from the national treasuries of the 
eleven Nazi-occupied territories and from the teeth and fingers of 
prisoners before they were put to death.27 
Almost twenty years after World War II, Swiss Federal Archive of-
ficials finally conducted a sweep of Swiss bank records for accounts 
dormant since the Holocaust.28 In connection with this search, a decree 
was passed by the Swiss government on December 20, 1962, as a 
compromise between bank secrecy and the obvious injustice to those 
who were disadvantaged by the maintenance of strict secrecy.29 The 
decree became effective on September 1, 1963, and remained valid for 
ten years.30 The decree applied to the "forgotten" accounts belonging 
22 See id.; Batsheva Tsur, Burg Asks for Details of Swedish Steel for Nazi Gold, JERUSALEM POST, 
Jan. 22, 1997, available in LEXlS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
25 See MacCarthaigh, supra note 1. High-ranking German officials often kept some of the seized 
assets for their own personal use. See id.; see also LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE 
FATE OF EUROPE's TREASURES IN THE ThIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994). 
24 See MacCarthaigh, supra note 1; Accounts Due, supra note 19. 
25 See MacCarthaigh, supra note l. 
26 See id. 
27 See id; Newshour: Righting Past Wrongs (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1997) (statement of 
Paul Volcker), <http://www l.pgs.org/newshour /bb/europe/janjune97 /gold_2-4.html> [here-
inafter Righting Past Wrongs]. 
28 See Michael Shields, Swiss Give Poland List of Wartime Bank Accounts, REUTERS FIN. SERV., 
Jan. 17, 1997, available in LEXlS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
29 See EDOUARD CHAMBOST, BANK ACCOUNTS: A WORLD GUIDE TO CONFIDENTIALITY 7-8 
(1983). Other professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, were subject to the decree. See id.; 
see generaUy, LE SECRET BANCAlRE SUISSE (Maurice Aubert, Jean-Philippe Kernen, & Herbert 
Schonle eds., 1995) [hereinafter AUBERT, SECRET BANCAlRE]. 
50 See CHAMBOST, supra note 29, at 7. 
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to foreign or stateless owners with whom there had been no positive 
contact since May 9, 1945.31 Pursuant to the decree, the "forgotten" 
assets were to be declared to the Missing Persons' Asset Bureau.32 Mter 
the ten years, the funds were distributed to the Swiss Federation of 
Israeli Communities in Zurich and to the Central Office for helping 
refugees.33 
B. Modern Investigations and Discoveries 
Until the end of 1995, the World Jewish Congress, through the 
efforts of president Edgar Bronfman,34 had been seeking answers and 
redress behind the scenes.35 Just like Jacob Freidman and Estelle Sapir 
when they tried to find answers about their lost family fortunes, Bronf-
man reached a dead-end when he requested that access be granted to 
Swiss bank records.36 Faced with a complete denial by Swiss bankers, 
Bronfman turned to Senator Alfonse D'Amato of New York, who as 
Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee launched a U.S. Senate 
investigation into Switzerland's role during the war.37 
Initially, the Swiss government argued that full disclosure was made 
during the reparations negotiations of 1946, and that the treaty en-
acted was still valid and enforceable.38 According to that agreement, 
Switzerland paid 371 million Swiss francs (SwF) (about 90 million U.S. 
dollars at the time) to settle Allied claims for reparations.39 
In May of 1996, an independent panel was created to investigate the 
allegations levied by the World Jewish Congress.40 Former U.S. Federal 
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker was appointed head of the investigative 
commission, which also featured representatives from Swiss banks and 
Jewish lobbies.41 The Volcker Commission is currently reviewing all 
31 See id. at B. 
32 See id.; AUBERT, SECRET BANCAIRE, supra note 29. 
33 See CHAMBOST, supra note 29, at B. 
34 Mr. Bronfman is also the chief executive of Seagram Inc. 
35 See MacCarthaigh, supra note 1. 
36 See id. 
37 Much of the initial investigation centered on newly declassified wartime documents. See id.; 
Swiss Banks Greet, supra note 14. 
38 See Marcus Kabel, Swiss Say 1946 Naz.i Wealth Accord Remains Valid, REUTERS EUR. Bus. REp., 
Sept. 25,1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws file [hereinafter Wealth Accord]. 
39The treaty was signed in the name of all the Allied countries, not solely the United States. 
See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See Righting Past Wrongs, supra note 27. 
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bank accounts opened by financial institutions between 1933 and 1945 
which have remained inactive for more than one decade.42 There is 
also a concurrent Swiss investigation, headed by Thomas Borer, a 
diplomat charged with examining all aspects of Swiss conduct during 
the war.43 Pending a full Swiss investigation, the banks agreed to estab-
lish a limited fund for Holocaust victims.44 
The three largest Swiss banks, Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss 
Bank and Credit Suisse, became the target of an organized boycott by 
New York City and New York State.45 The boycott came after a leak of 
an internal cable by Carlo Jagmetti, the Swiss Ambassador to Washing-
ton, urging the Swiss Minister of Foreign Mfairs to "wage war against 
those making allegations that Swiss banks had acted improperly. "46 
Moreover, on the night of January 9, 1997, a security guard for Union 
Bank of Switzerland, while making his rounds, discovered two cartloads 
of documents dating back to World War II in the bank's shredding 
room, awaiting destruction.47 The Swiss government had recently pass-
ed a law prohibiting the destruction of any document relating to the 
war.48 The security guard was promptly fired after he removed some 
documents from the carts and turned them over to the World Jewish 
Congress.49 Faced with these allegations, the three largest banks and 
the Swiss government established a fund for Holocaust survivors living 
in need.50 
The walls of bank secrecy are also beginning to crack in the face of 
international outcry.51 On January 17, 1997, Switzerland released the 
42 See U.S. Says Swiss Moving Appropriately on Nazi Gold, REUTERS WORLD SERv.,jan. 13, 1997, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
43 Under the authority of the Foreign Ministry, the Swiss Commission was created in October 
1996. Id. 
44Id. 
45 See id. 
46 See Marcus Kabel, Swiss Apologize to jews, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, jan. 15, 1997, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Swiss Apologize]. Switzerland's Economic Minister, 
jean-Pascal Delamuraz, called the jewish demands for restitution "extortion and blackmail." See 
id. 
47 See MacCarthaigh, supra note 1. 
48Id. 
49 Id. Later, a historian working for Union Bank claimed that none of the documents which 
were ultimately destroyed had any relation to the ongoing investigation. See Greg Calhoun, 
Suspicious Swiss Guard Givesjews Bank Documents, jan. 14, 1997, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, available 
in LEXlS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
50 See Newshour: Swiss Accounting (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 28, 1997) (statement of 
Thomas Borer), <http://www1.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/janjune97/nazi_2.28.html>.Itis 
not known if any disbursements have actually been made. 
51 The Swiss Parliament gave final approval in December 1996, to a panel of historians and 
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names of 53 Polish citizens whose accounts have been dormant since 
before the war. 52 According to a Swiss report, the Swiss government 
paid Warsaw 464,000 SwF in 1975, under a pact that settled Swiss claims 
for property seized by communist Poland after the war. 53 At the time 
of the settlement, however, Switzerland would not divulge the account 
holders' names, thus Poland placed the fund into its national budget, 
but was never able to search for possible heirs.54 The money to fund 
the payout came from a pool of 10 million SwF found in the 1960s 
search for ownerless accounts.55 While answers to all the allegations 
may never be known, the questions being raised attack the heart of the 
financial privacy system and the international banking community. 
II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF BANK SECRECY LAWS 
A. History of Laws 
While the desire to keep personal financial transactions out of the 
public eye has always been inherent to a money-changing civilization, 
systematic practice and codification of bank secrecy laws did not occur 
until after World War 1.56 The hyperinflation and exchange controls 
caused by World War I compelled financially prudent individuals to 
place assets in banks and other financial institutions outside their 
home nations.57 Each time a nation restricted the interest and ex-
change rates in attempts to control chaotic post-war economies, the 
appeal of stable and friendly economic environments was enhanced.58 
Against this backdrop of capital flight, Nazi Germany enacted swift and 
deadly penalties to stem the new bank secrecy order.59 Mter coming to 
power in 1933, the Nazi government enacted a regulation requiring 
experts empowered to lift the strict secrecy laws and conduct searches into bank archives. See 
Marcus Kabel, Swiss Banks Hail Government's Help on Holocaust Funds, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, 
Oct. 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Government Help). 
52 See Shields, supra note 28. 
53 Polish-{)wned bank accounts held in Swiss banks were used to offset Swiss claims. See id; 
Righting Past Wrongs, supra note 27. 
54 See Shields, supra note 28. A similar problem exists with a 1975 payoff to Hungary of 325,000 
SwF. 
55 See id. 
56 See C. ToddJones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States' Assault on Foreign Bank Secrecy, 
12 Nw. J. INT'L L. Bus. 454, 455 (1992); CHAMBOST, supra note 29, at 5. 
5? See Jones, supra note 56, at 455. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
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all German nationals to declare assets held outside of Germany, with 
non-compliance punishable by death.60 When three Germans were 
executed the following year, the Swiss government codified the secrecy 
customs of Swiss bankers.61 
In the early days of World War II, the Swiss, fearing a German 
invasion after the fall of Poland and France, physically moved their 
national supply of gold bullion to New York.62 Although the United 
States had not yet officially declared war against Germany in mid-1941, 
U.S. government officials attempted to gain access to the names of 
accounts held in the American branches of Swiss banks.63 The officials 
were looking to block Nazi controlled assets from being hidden in the 
United States.54 Mter learning the accounts were held only in the 
names of the banks and not the clients, the United States banned the 
expatriation of all Swiss assets and gold reserves.65 
Just as bank secrecy expanded in the economic chaos after World 
War I, the necessity and desire for improved bank secrecy and financial 
protections also increased after World War 11.66 The economic controls 
imposed by governments during the war remained in effect, but capital 
flight continued as socialism and burdensome income taxes rose.67 The 
growth of banking centers that protected bank customer identities and 
assets were also facilitated by the desire to hide assets from government 
investigation for taxation, the rise in international crime, and the 
60 The statute stated: "Any German national who, deliberately or otherwise, activated by a base 
selfishness or other vile motive, has amassed his wealth abroad or left capital outside the country, 
shall be punished by death." See CHAMBOST, supra note 29, at 5; see generaUy NICHOLAS, supra 
note 23 (discussing "reallocation" of assets and the exploitation of Entartete Kunst [degenerate 
art] belonging to conquered peoples and other "undesirables" accomplished under the Nazi 
regime). 
61 See Jones, supra note 56, at 455; see also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GoVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 
CRIME AND SECRECY, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES 5--6 
(Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter STAFF REpORT]. 
62 The Swiss had moved the bank assets to U.S. financial institutions after the invasion of Poland. 
See Jones, supra note 56, at 455; see also Righting Past Wrongl, supra note 27 (68 million U.S. 
dollars in gold still remains in the U.S. and Britain). 
63 See Jones, supra note 56, at 455. 
&I See id. 
65 See id.; CHAMBOST, supra note 29, at 6--7. 
66 See Jones, supra note 56, at 456. 
67 See id.; see also United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983). 
-------------------
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efforts of many small nations68 to keep hard currency within their 
borders.69 
After World War II, an additional secrecy device known as "blocking 
laws" emerged.70 These laws were designed to prevent individuals and 
other entities from divulging financial information to foreign tribunals 
and governments. 71 In 1947, Canada became the first nation to enact 
this type of secrecy law, after a U.S. grand jury investigation of the 
Canadian paper industry.72 These types oflaws have spread throughout 
the world since 1947.73 Nations, reacting to countries with aggressive 
trade litigation,74 have attempted to use blocking laws to protect do-
mestic interests from foreign legal interference and infringements 
on national sovereignty.75 The controversy over investigative reach 
spawned the broadest international response when the United States 
conducted probes into the international shipping industry and the 
world uranium carteP6 Many of the nations which enacted blocking 
laws in response to U.S. government investigations viewed the antitrust 
litigation and discovery procedures as protecting U.S. industries a-
68 Secrecy jurisdictions are not limited to only small or non-democratic nations. Many of the 
Pacific Rim's industrialized countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, attract capital by 
offering secrecy practices for tax purposes. See STAFF REpORT, supra note 61, at 10-11; Jones, 
supra note 56, at 456 n.8. 
The Staff Report lists the following countries as secrecy or tax havens: Anguilla, Antigua, 
Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Bahrain, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cayman 
Islands, Channel Islands, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Gre-
nada, Guam, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Ireland, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, 
Mariana Islands, Mexico, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles, 
Nevis, New Hebrides (Vanuatu), Panama, Seychelles, Singapore, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, 
Switzerland, and Turks and Caicos Islands. See STAFF REpORT, supra note 61, at 10-11. 
69 Donald M. Fleming, the former Canadian Minister of Finance and former President of the 
International Monetary Fund, now president of a Bahamian bank, voiced the typical view of the 
necessity of bank secrecy laws: ''The secrecy attached to relations and transactions between 
financial institutions and their clients has been another factor essential in the attraction of 
financial business." CHAMBOST, supra note 29, at 196. 
70 See Jones, supra note 56, at 458. 
7J See id. 
72 See In re Grand Jury, Subpoena Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian International Paper 
Company, 73 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y 1947); see also Ontario, Canada's Business Records Protec-
tion Act, 1974 ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 54; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw (THIRD): FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES, § 442 reporters' note 4 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD]. 
73 See Jones, supra note 56, at 458. 
74 The United States is the most likely target of blocking laws, as it is the most aggressive in 
pursuing international antitrust and competition investigations. See id. 
75 See id., citing A. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 79-225 (1983). 
76 See id. at 458, citing LOWE, supra note 75, at 98-100,123,128,129-31,134, 138-43 (Australia, 
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gainst foreign competition by requiring the foreign industries to di-
vulge their secrets during the litigation.77 
B. Structure of Laws 
The core of bank secrecy and financial privacy laws is the non-dis-
closure of personal and transactional information.78 One form of these 
laws, such as blocking laws, operates to forbid external disclosure,79 
while secrecy laws discourage mainly internal disclosure.8o As each 
nation develops and faces differing financial circumstances, the finan-
cial privacy practices employed vary to effectuate both the goals sought 
and the economic relationships.8! 
1. Structural Bank Forms and Impediments to Disclosure 
The two main forms of bank secrecy relationships that can exist 
between the financial institution and the bank customer are anony-
mous or numbered accounts and accounts held under false names.82 
The account holder signs an agreement with a personal bank agent 
agreeing to the terms and conditions of the relationship, then receives 
a number or pseudonym.83 Under this agreement, the structure or 
nature of the relationship between bank and client changes, from a 
human identity to solely a numeric identity, so as to provide the pro-
tection of privacy and inaccessibility.84 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, and West Germany enacted blocking laws in response to the probes); see also 
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); In & 
Investigations of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production, Transportation, Refining, 
and Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 
F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979); STAFF REpORT, supra note 61, at 13-14 (Congressional recognition 
of the connection between U.S. government action and foreign government reaction); RESTATE-
MENT THIRD, supra note 72, § 442 reporters' note 4. 
77 See Jones, supra note 56, at 458-59; STAFF REpORT, supra note 61, at 13-14; Reinsurance Co. 
of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1990) (Romanian 
interest in secrecy outweighed by U.S. interests). 
78 "Personal" includes the activities of business associations. 
79 See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text. 
80 See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text. 
81 See Jones, supra note 56, at 459. 
82 See id. 
83 See CHAMBOST, supra note 29, at 41-54. To avoid alerting home government authorities, the 
client will normally receive a pseudonym account, with all bank correspondence appearing to be 
between actual persons. See id. 
84 See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text. 
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Prior to the creation of numbered accounts by Swiss bankers, the 
Gestapo would routinely target low level Swiss bank employees for asset 
information concerning certain individuals.85 The slightest hesitation 
would give the Gestapo officer "cause" to investigate and prosecute the 
Swiss bank's customer under the foreign holdings law.86 Anonymous 
accounts eliminated the ability of third parties to coerce secret bank 
and client information, because the majority of lower level bank em-
ployees had no access to the names corresponding to the numbered 
accounts.87 
With the addition of a trust or corporate structure, a triple level of 
protection is available.88 Here, a trust is drafted with either an individ-
ual or corporate fiduciary holding assets in their own name for a 
beneficiary.89 
2. Bank Secrecy Laws 
The underlying foundation to the various structural forms of pro-
tection available in secrecy jurisdictions is a separate system of laws 
which protect the relationship between the banker and the client.90 In 
Switzerland, there is a special privilege between the banker and the 
client.91 A violation, such as information disclosure, is strictly criminal-
ized.92 The codification of the informal banking custom in Swiss Bank-
85 See Jones, supra note 56, at 459. 
86 See CHAMBOST, supra note 29, at 5. 
87 See id. at 40. The secret accounts also limited the ability for unscrupulous employees to access 
client information. See id. 
88 SeeJones, supra note 56, at 459-60; see generally Beat Kleiner, Banking Law, in INTRODUCTION 
TO SWISS LAw 175-86 (Tugrul Ansay & Don Wallace,Jr. eds., 1995). The identities of the actual 
settlor and beneficiary are replaced by the trust identity, which is itself numbered or otherwise 
held secret, adding another layer on to the secrecy. 
89 See Kleiner, supra note 88, at 182-83. Under Swiss law, banks as institutions are covered under 
public legislation, while banking transactions are regulated under the Civil Code and Code of 
Obligations. See id. 
90 See Jones, supra note 56, at 460-61. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. at 461; Bundesgesetz uber die Banken und Sparkassen of Nov. 8,1934 (Banking Law 
of 1934), implemented in Verordnung of May 17, 1972 (Ordinance), and Vollziehungsverord-
nung of Aug. 30,1961 (Implementing Ordinance). Article 47 of the 1934 Banking Law states: 
1. Whoever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity as officer, employee, 
authorized agent, liquidator or commissioner of a bank, as representative of the Banking 
Commission, officer or employee of a recognized auditing company, or who has become 
aware of such a secret in this capacity, and whoever tries to induce others to violate 
professional secrecy, shall be punished by a prison term not to exceed six months or by 
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ing Law, establishes specific duties for the bankers, their employees, 
and the government inspectors.93 
3. Blocking Laws 
As noted earlier, blocking laws were enacted to stem the tide of 
foreign investigations into the business practices of foreign-based asso-
ciations and individuals.94 They are designed to "prohibit the disclo-
sure, copying, inspection or removal of documents located in the host 
country in compliance with orders of foreign authorities,''95 and to take 
advantage of the foreign government compulsion defense.96 There are 
two categories of blocking laws. The first prohibits the production of 
documents; the second, testimony before a foreign tribunal.97 The 
block can be either a general protection of business and commercial 
documents or particular to an industry.98 
The first blocking statute, enacted by Canada in 1947, to combat a 
U.S. probe of the paper industry, has been expanded to prevent the 
disclosure of all business records, including bank records.99 Like the 
Canadian law, the Swiss Penal Code, Article 273, also prohibits disclo-
a fine not exceeding 50,000 SwF [approximately 35,000 USD (1997 rates)J. 
2. If the act has been committed by negligence, the penalty shall be a fine not exceeding 
30,000 SwF [approximately 21,000 USDJ. 
3. The violation of professional secrecy remains punishable even after termination of 
the official employment relationship of the exercise of the profession. 
See id. at n.37, citing R. KINSMAN, YOUR NEW SWISS BANK BOOK 10 n.2 (revised ed. 1979). 
98 See Jones, supra note 56, at 462. Swiss law defines some circumstances, such as crimes, which 
require banks to furnish financial information because the public or state interest involved is 
greater than the interest in secrecy. See id. citing KINSMAN, supra note 92, at 11. 
94 See Jones, supra note 56, at 462-63. 
95 See STAFF REpORT, supra note 61, at 13; RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 72, § 442 reporters' 
note 4. 
96 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 72, § 442 reporters' note 4. "[AJ state may not require 
a person to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of that state or by the law of 
the state of which he is a national." See id. § 441(I)(a). 
97 See Jones, supra note 56, at 463. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. at 463-64 n.50, citing LOWE, supra note 75, at 100"'{)2. That Canadian statute states: 
1. No person shall, pursuant to or under or in a manner that would be consistent with 
compliance with any ... order ... or subpoena of any legislative, administrative or 
judicial authority in any jurisdiction outside Ontario, take ... , send ... or remove ... 
from a point in Ontario to a point outside Ontario, any ... material in any way relating 
to any business carried on in Ontario, unless such taking, sending, or removal, 
a) is consistent with and forms a part of a regular practice of furnishing to a head office 
or parent company or organization ... ; is provided for by or under any law of Ontario 
or of the Parliament of Canada. 
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sure of "manufacturing or business secretIs]" for any reason or pur-
pose. IOO The second category of blocking laws prohibits substantive 
compliance with the orders of foreign government officials. 101 
Blocking laws provide a greater level of protection of financial pri-
vacy than structural forms and bank secrecy laws. 102 Under a blocking 
statute, individuals, business entities, and government actors can refuse 
to disclose financial information, even though they may be under 
subpoena or government order.103 Bank secrecy laws protect the actual 
privileged relationship between banker and customer, while blocking 
laws preven t the actual divulgence of banking and transactional docu-
ments. 104 
III. THE TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE CREATION OF COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
A. Secrecy in the United States 
Historically, the United States has been at odds with the blocking 
laws and secrecy statutes enacted in countries around the world. 105 
Perceiving foreign bank secrecy as facilitating and promoting illegal 
activity, the United States has continued its efforts to enforce its na-
tionallaws regardless of the possible effect on foreign economic regu-
1974 ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 54, § 1. The Minister of justice, Attorney General and any party in 
interest may request an injunction to ensure that document production will be blocked. See id. 
§ 2(1). Production made after notice that an application for an injunction has been made is 
punishable by up to one year in prison. See id. §§ 2(2), (3); jones, supra note 56, at 463 n.50, 
citing LOWE, supra note 75, at 101-D2. 
100 Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code reads: 
Whoever explores a manufacturing or business secret to make it accessible to a foreign 
authority or a foreign organization or a foreign private business enterprise, or their 
agents, shall be punished with imprisonment, insolvency serious cases with penitentiary 
confinement. The deprivation of liberty can be combined with a fine. 
Moreover, Article 271 forbids Swiss citizens from cooperating with a foreign state without authori-
zation from the Swiss government. See Christopher D. Liguori, Yossarian's Nightmare: A "Catch-
22" Between American Grand Jury Powers and Swiss Nondisclosure Laws-A New Solution, 2 A.VI. 
VJ. INT'L L. & POL'y 229, 232-33 n.14 (1987). 
101 See jones, supra note 56, at 464, citing LOWE, supra note 75, at xviii, 98-100,104-105, 123, 
138-43, 186-93. 
102 See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text. 
103 See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text. 
104 See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text. 
105 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
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lation and banking practice. loo In 1970, the House Committee on 
Banking and Currency declared: 
[s]ecret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign financial 
institutions have permitted a proliferation of ''white collar" 
crimes; have served as the financial underpinning of organ-
ized criminal operation in the United States; have been util-
ized by Americans to evade income taxes, conceal assets ille-
gally and purchase gold; have allowed Americans and others 
to avoid the law and regulations governing securities and 
exchanges; have served as essential ingredients in frauds in-
cluding schemes to defraud the United States; have served as 
the ultimate depository of black market proceeds from Viet-
nam; have served as a source of questionable financing for 
stock acquisitions, mergers and takeovers; have covered con-
spiracy to steal from the U.S. defense and foreign aid funds; 
and have served as the cleaning agent for "hot" or illegally 
obtained monies .... The debilitating effects of the use of 
these secret institutions on Americans and the American 
economy are vast. It has been estimated that hundreds of 
millions in tax revenues have been lost.107 
This is not to suggest that U.S. law allows open access to financial 
information. lOB Individuals and other entities are given limited protec-
tion from undesired and unwarranted disclosure by the common law, 
specific statutes, and the U.S. ConstitutionYJ9 
106 See H. Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970). 
107 See id.; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985) (Nova Scotia II); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Bank of 
Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) (Nova Scotia I); 
United Statesv. Vetco, 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981); STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON NARCOTICS, 
'IERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., DRUG MONEY LAUNDERING, 
BANKS AND FOREIGN POLICY 32 (Comm. Print 1990) (report recommended "aggressively 
pursu ling] international negotiations backed up by the threat of sanctions against banks and 
countries that do not cooperate" with the U.S.); James Springer, An Overview of International 
Evidence and Asset Gathering in Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 
277,330 (1988); Hon.John Conyers, Jr., Curporate and R1tite Collar Crime: A View by the Chairman 
of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 287, 288 (1980), reprinted in Braswell 
v. United States, 487 U.S. 99,115 n.9 (1988). But see CHAMBOST, supra note 29, at 101 (responding 
to the 1970 Congressional report by commenting that the United States seemed to be out for 
scapegoats more than bank secrecy). 
108 See infra notes 110-35 and accompanying text. 
109 See id. 
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1. Common Law Protections 
Under U.S. common law, bankers and their customers may agree to 
a contractual relationship providing for a limited degree of customer 
privacy.110 This common law relationship was established in Great Brit-
ain in 1924, by the landmark decision of Tournier v. National Provincial 
and Union Bank of England. III Tournier determined in which circum-
stances the contractual relationship between the client and his banker 
would be superseded. ll2 Courts in the United States have followed this 
decision to provide for the termination of the contractual banking 
duties when: a) disclosures are compelled by law; b) there is a duty to 
the public to disclose; c) the interests of the bank require disclosure; 
or d) when disclosure is made with the express or implied consent of 
the customer. Jl3 
U.S. legal doctrine has also protected banking information under 
agency law theory by imposing a duty on the banking institution as 
the agent for the depositor-principal to safeguard financial informa-
tion from disclosure.n4 Doctrine has also allowed state constitutions to 
create a privacy interest in bank records.ll5 The protections afforded 
by the common law, however, have been circumvented by govern-
ment investigators and private parties utilizing the exceptions listed in 
Tournier. 116 
110 See Jones, supra note 56, at 464-65; Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of 
England, 1924 K.B. 461 (Eng. C.A.). 
III See Toumier, 1924 K.B. 461. 
112 In light of widespread money laundering and other abuses in recent years, the European 
Union (EU) has begun a process of scaling back the secrecy protections available in some Member 
States. See DENNIS CAMPBELL, INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY 727-28 (1992). OnJune 28, 1991, 
the EU adopted Directive 91/308 to prevent money laundering in the European financial 
markets. See EC Council Directive 91/308, art. 1, 1991 OJ. (L 166) 77. The general policy for 
banking supervision, however, is dealt with under the "mutual trust" principle. See CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 621 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 1993). Under this 
principle, professional secrecy between the bank and the client remains generally undisturbed, 
with each state entrusted with protecting the stability and integrity of the common financial 
market. See id.; EC Council Directive 89/646, art. 16(1), 1989 OJ. (L 386) 1. However harmonized 
the system becomes, the principle of bank secrecy will not likely disappear, because it is beneficial 
to the financial markets. See CAMPBELL, supra, at 744. 
lIS See Jones, supra note 56, at 464-66; Charles Thelen Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: 
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 INT'L LAw. 69, 69 (1988). 
114 See Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961). 
115 See Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 
553 (1975); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974); 
James E. Eldridge, The Bank Secrecy Act: Privacy, Comity, and the Politics of Contraband, 11 N .CJ. 
J:oU'L L. & COM. REG. 667, 682 (1986). 
116 See Jones, supra note 56, at 465. Courts have also examined the idea of a privacy right 
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2. Statutory Protections 
With the enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) in 1970, Con-
gress provided government agencies with access to bank records of 
individuals in order to facilitate investigations in the criminal, tax, and 
regulatory arenas.117 The BSA mandated record-keeping of major cur-
rency and international transactions and listing of account holders' 
names and financial instruments by all banks and financial institutions, 
but provided little in the way of procedural safeguards for individu-
als.ns 
In 1978, the passage of the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) 
was in tended to remedy the lack of safeguards available in the BSA.ll9 
The RFPA restricts the access granted under the BSA to federal agen-
cies for financial information belonging to individuals and small part-
nerships without consent, judicial or administrative subpoena, search 
warrant, or a special RFPA formal written request for records.120 The 
RFPA does not, however, curtail the access of private parties or state 
and local authorities, nor does it abridge the gathering of financial 
information for entities other than individuals and partnerships of five 
members or less.121 
Even the restrictions imposed by the RFPA may be widely circum-
vented because of the broad discretion given to governmental author-
ity (at all levels) and private parties during the course of a criminal or 
civil investigation.122 Subpoenas issued under the broad discretionary 
emanating from property law. See FTC v. American Tobacco, 264 U.S. 298 (1924); Brex v. Smith, 
104 NJ. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (NJ. Ch. 1929) (citing In rePacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241 (C.C.N.D. 
Cal. 1887). Tort law theories of invasion of privacy and defamation were also reviewed. See 
Plombeck, supra note 113, at 69 n.3, citing L. FISCHER, THE LAw OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 1 5.04 
(1983). 
117 See Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (1991)). 
118 See infra notes 110-35 and accompanying text. 
119 See Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1991)). 
120 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3408 (1991). 
121 See Eldridge, supra note 115, at 681; but see notes 114-16 and accompanying text (legal 
protections available under agency theory and express state constitutional authority to maintain 
privacy interest in bank records). 
122 See Jones, supra note 56, at 466. Under the most controversial power, subpoenas issued 
during a grand jury investigation carry the threat of contempt of court for non-compliance and 
subject banks and other corporations to stiff fines and individuals to imprisonment. See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 17. For foreign service, document production and personal appearance may be required 
if the court finds that either " ... is in the interest of justice .... " See 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (1991). 
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power of administrative agencies also carry with them a low eviden tiary 
need threshold similar to that of the grand jury.123 Moreover, state 
subpoenas are not subject to RFPA restrictions, and therefore, not 
subject to the procedural safeguards of due process contained in the 
Act. 124 
Private parties wishing to obtain financial information and banking 
records similarly have few boundaries during the course of civil discov-
ery investigations. The Federal Rules confine discovery to matters " ... 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action," which need not be admissible as evidence at trial,l25 
The banker-client relationship is not contained within the traditional 
privilege categories, and the federal courts have shown scant inclina-
tion to entertain new categories of privilege.126 
3. Constitutional Protections 
The interest of the United States in enforcing its laws has consistently 
outweighed any interest of the depositor.!27 Even the Fourth Amend-
ment's Search and Seizure Clause was held not to prohibit access to 
financial information under the BSA128 In United States v. Miller, the 
Supreme Court stated, "[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his 
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person 
to the Government. "129 In addition, the Court suggested that the checks 
and deposit slips were negotiable instruments voluntarily conveyed to 
the bank, thus, there was no legitimate expectation of privacy in their 
contents. 130 Moreover, banks and bank employees may not invoke the 
123 Agencies do not need probable cause to issue their subpoenas. See United States v. Morton 
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) (The "power to [administrative] inquisition ... is more 
analogous to a Grand Jury, which ... can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being 
violated, or even because it wants assurance that it is not.") (emphasis added). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(b) (1991) ("For the purpose of any such investigation, ... any ... officer designated by 
[the Securities and Exchange Commission] is empowered to ... require the production of any 
... records which the Commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry.") (emphasis added). 
124 See Eldridge, supra note ll5, at 681. 
125 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1). 
126 See id.; Jones, supra note 56, at 468. 
127 See United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 408-09 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 429 U.S. 940 (1976); 
Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1391; Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 829; G. Philip Rutledge, Bank Secrecy 
Laws: An American Perspective, 14 DICK.]. INT'L L. 601, 606-08 (1996). 
128 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . . "); 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
129 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
130 See id. at 442. Later decisions similarly upheld this reasoning even in cases dealing with 
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Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination even though disclo-
sure would be a violation of their national laws.131 
The banking system of the United System is best classified as con-
tractual: the government will seek to maintain a safe banking system 
for the citizen-customer, who in return for this benefit, implicitly 
authorizes the government to obtain all necessary information to en-
sure criminal laws are being upheld.132 The same implicit contract 
exists between the financial institutions and the government as well.133 
In the United States, privacy in financial affairs is allowed only to the 
extent that there is no reasonable governmental or public interest 
requiring disclosure.134 In contrast, the Swiss view financial privacy as 
the most important public interest.135 
B. Traditional Efforts to Resolve Conflicts Between the Secrecy 
Jurisdiction and the Need for Access 
There are two inherent facets of bank secrecy laws which confound 
the tracing of dormant accounts: inefficient and inadequate proce-
dures for obtaining access to records and lack of supervision of bank-
ing institutions.136 Although circumstances have forced secrecy jurisdic-
tions to ease their secrecy laws in particular instances, there remains 
arguably no viable procedures for individuals seeking information. 
While no one would argue that the actual account holder could not 
easily obtain information based on the bank's duties and obligations 
to its customer, access to accounts becomes insurmountably difficult 
when the individual requesting information is one step removed.137 
"protected bank records." See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 nA (1980) (Bahamian 
account was not protected by the [Bahamian] statute or the Fourth Amendment because no 
legitimate expectation of privacy interest); see also United States v. Mann, 829 F.2d 849, 852 (9th 
Cir.1987). 
l5I See U.S. CONST. amend. V (''No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself ... "); Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n ofInvestigation, 406 U.S. 472, 
478 (1972). Most circuits have, to their credit, adopted a "case-by case" approach to determining 
whether real fear of home state prosecution exists, thus allowing Fifth Amendment protection. 
See Craig Depew, Sidestepping Foreign Bank Secrecy Laws: No Sanctuary in the Fifth Amendment and 
Little in the Interest of Comity, 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 57, 77-85 (1987). Corporate custodians of 
records have no Fifth Amendment protection because they are acting in a representative capacity. 
See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85,89-90 
(1974). 
1~2 See supra notes 105-31 and accompanying text. 
I~See id. 
154 See id. 
135 See supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text. 
136 See infra notes 142-79 and accompanying text. 
U7 Swiss law does accord heirs the rights and obligations of the deceased under the principle 
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In general, a delicate balance of cooperation has been struck be-
tween countries whose national laws, policies, and procedures inher-
ently conflict. Treaties, informal agreements, and multilateral coopera-
tion have served to facilitate exchanges and resolution between nations 
when a particular issue arises.138 These joint actions or special grants 
of authority are based upon international comity.139 Comity was defined 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot as: 
... neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, 
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is 
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory 
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, 
having due regard both to international duty and conven-
ience, and to the rights of its own citizens or other persons 
who are under the protection of its laws.140 
By comity, the nations seek not to infringe upon the sovereignty of the 
other, but to act voluntarily in cooperation in furtherance of individual 
rights and common justice, in areas not regulated by formal treaties. HI 
1. Comity 
The use of comity and other more formal acts of cooperation be-
tween nations that allow bank secrecy and those that do not, have been 
most successful in the area of criminal investigations. 142 The traditional 
method for obtaining information for private or government actions 
from foreign nations is the letter rogatory.143 The primary basis for a 
of direct and immediate succession. See CAMPBELL, supra note 112, at 675. The right of secrecy, 
including the correlative rights to release the bank from its secrecy obligation and to obtain 
information, is a right of the property holder. See id. The only exception is for "highly personal 
rights." See id. Whether the nature of information is highly personal is judged by objective criteria. 
See id. If the information is highly personal, it may not be disclosed to the heirs or executor by 
the bank. See id. The Swiss Bankers' Association holds that the bank must only disclose the status 
of the account at the time of decedent's death, but not any transactions performed prior to death. 
See CAMPBELL, supra note 112, at 675. This practice is discouraged by critics and many courts. 
See id. 
138 See Jones, supra note 56, at 471. 
IS!! See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 
543 n.27 (1987) ("Comity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal 
approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states."); 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). 
140 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64. 
HI See id. at 164-66. 
H2The only treaty concerning letters rogatory is the European Convention on Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, opened for signature Apr. 20, 1959,472 U.N.T.S. 185. 
143 See The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.n. La. 1941) ("Letters rogatory are the medium ... 
480 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No.2 
letter rogatory rests with comity. 144 Although a request for information 
via a letter rogatory is usually granted, there are procedural and prac-
tical defects in the system such that, for individual actors, any benefit 
received is essentially relegated.145 
Lack of explicit procedures in formulating the letters rogatory and 
the requirement of some countries of proceeding through formal 
diplomatic channels incurs extensive time and money costs for individ-
ual actors. l46 In addition, the letter must be sufficiently complete and 
understandable to a foreign judge in order to secure approval. 147 While 
a government may have the resources to complete all the procedural 
requirements, the current system could force private citizens to aban-
don their claims.148 Another potentially damaging hurdle is that the 
foreign judge may defer to national laws and procedures and refuse 
certain types of investigations, typically fiscal offenses. 149 Lastly, many 
countries will not recognize certain investigatory procedures as valid 
reasons to approve a letter rogatory or will refuse to compel the home 
entity to incur the expense of producing records without substantial 
belief that the search is purposeful or will be successful. 150 This presents 
a tremendous problem for individuals seeking access to confidential 
records unless they have explicit proof that accounts exist and that they 
whereby one country, speaking through one of its courts, requests another country, acting 
through its own courts and by methods of court procedure peculiar thereto and entirely within 
the latter's control, to assist the administration of justice in the former country .... "). See also 
In reWestinghouse Electric Corp. and Duquesne Light Co., 16 O.R. 2d 273, 290 (1977) (Ont.) 
(Duquesne Light). 
144 See id. 
145 See The Signe, 37 F. Supp. at 820. 
146 See James I.K. Knapp, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way to Pierce Bank Secrecy, 20 
CASE W. REs.]. INT'L L. 405, 406 n.4 (1988). See also Nova Scotia!, 691 F.2d at 1390; RESTATEMENT 
THIRD, supra note 72, § 473 reporters' note 1. 
147 See Knapp, supra note 146, at 409. 
145 The possible use of the Hague Evidence Convention procedures for obtaining information 
in civil matters is similarly limited in scope and effectiveness. See Convention on the Taking of 
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 
2555, (implemented in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-82 (1991)) [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]. 
Because of the formal channels required, the process is extremely slow and expensive, and thus, 
unhelpful to most individuals. 
149 See Knapp, supra note 146, at 409-10; ~tco, 644 F.2d at 1333 (distinguishing investigations 
for tax violations from tax fraud, "[t]he Swiss Federal Attorney has stated that tax [violation] 
investigations are fiscal matters, and that it would be unable to respond favorably to a letter 
rogatory."); Duquesne Light, 16 O.R. 2d at 286-87 (''The Court is entitled to go behind letters 
rogatory, to examine precisely what it is the foreign Court is seeking to do, and to give effect to 
them only if they satisfy the requirements of the law of this jurisdiction. "). 
150 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 72, § 442 reporters' note 1; Jones, supra note 56, at 
472. 
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are entitled under Swiss law to obtain information pertaining to the 
accounts. 151 In the case of the Holocaust survivors, this requirement 
proved especially tragic since almost all documentation the individuals 
might have had was destroyed by the Nazis. 152 
2. Treaties and Agreements 
Switzerland and other bank secrecy jurisdictions have begun to relax 
their privacy laws in recognition of criminal abuses of their banking 
systems. 153 Several treaties, agreements, and resolutions promulgated 
by the United Nations have allowed government officials to gain access 
to the actual customer names of suspect accounts and to the nature of 
the suspect transactions. 154 
In 1973, the United States and Switzerland agreed to a Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty (Swiss MLAT) , which was enacted to combat organ-
ized crime. 155 Under the Swiss MLAT, a Swiss bank may grant access to 
private banking records in certain circumstances. 156 The U.S. officials, 
however, must be investigating a serious crime and have made a rea-
sonable but unsuccessful attempt to obtain the information by other 
means. 157 It was hoped that the Swiss MLAT would be as comprehensive 
as the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters.158 
151 Under most secrecy jurisdictions accounts are held under numbers or pseudonyms and thus 
locating accounts is additionally difficult for individuals. See supra note 137 and accompanying 
text. 
152The Swiss banks have also allegedly destroyed potential documentation. See MacCarthaigh, 
supra note l. 
153 See infra notes 155-68 and accompanying text. 
154 See id. 
155 See Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25, 1973, 27 
U.S.T. 2019 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter Swiss MlAT]; Frank C. Razzano, 
American Money Laundering Statutes: The Case for a Worldwide System of Banking Compliance 
Programs, 3]. hn'L L. & PRAC. 277, 302 (1994); Robert Louis Stauter, Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws 
and the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 20 CASE W. REs.]. bn'L L. 623, 629 (1988). 
156 See Swiss MlAT, supra note 155; Stauter, supra note 155, at 629. 
157 See Swiss MlAT, supra note 155; Stauter, supra note 155, at 629; Eldridge, supra note 115, 
at 690. 
158 See European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, opened for signature 
Dec. 13, 1957, 84 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Criminal Convention]; Stauter, supra note 155, at 
629. Originally the Members could refuse to cooperate if the request concerned a "political 
offence, ... or a fiscal offence." See Criminal Convention, supra at art. 2(a). The "fiscal offence" 
provision was later repealed. See Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, 1978 Eur. T.S. No. 99. 
482 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No.2 
In response to the Swiss MLAT's ineffectiveness in pursuing insider 
trading violations,159 (and to protect its reputation), the Swiss Bankers' 
Association, the Swiss National Bank, and other banks of Switzerland, 
enacted a private agreement for assistance with economic crimes. lOO 
The pact was entitled the Agreement on the Observance of Care in 
Accepting Funds and the Practice of Banking Secrecy (Agreement).161 
Nearly every bank voluntarily signed the Agreement in July of 1977, 
and its updated version of October 1982.162 
In 1981, a U.S. district court declared sanctions against a Swiss bank 
for not providing the Securities and Exchange Commission with the 
names of its customers who were being investigated for an insider 
trading scheme.163 The court balanced the interest of the Swiss bank 
in maintaining secrecy and upholding its privacy laws, against the U.S. 
interest in having integrity in its securities markets. 1M The judge found 
the U.S. interest to be compelling. l65 
Faced with this increasing pressure, the Swiss invited U.S. officials to 
Bern in March of 1982.166 Using the Agreement as a foundation, the 
United States and Switzerland signed the Memorandum of Under-
standing (Swiss MOU), in August, 1982.167 Although it has never been 
approved by either nation's legislative body, and as such is not binding, 
it promises cooperation in insider trading investigations.168 
Although the Swiss government and other secrecy jurisdictions have 
executed treaties and agreements providing for mutual legal assistance, 
159 See Stauter, supra note 155, at 629; Eldridge, supra note 115, at 690. The Swiss MlAT only 
provided for cooperation in criminal investigations that were considered a crime in both coun-
tries; insider trading is not a crime in Switzerland. 
160 See Stauter, supra note 155, at 629-30. 
161 See ill. 
162 See ill.; Maurice Aubert, The Limits of Swiss Banking Secrecy Under Domestic Law, 2 INT'L TAX 
& Bus. LAw 273, 282 (1984) [hereinafter Aubert, Limits]. The Agreement had three principal 
objectives: a) to prevent Swiss bank use for illegally acquired funds by requiring the verification 
of depositors, b) to prevent illegal use of safe deposit boxes, and c) to prevent tax evasion. Aubert, 
Limits, supra at 283. A distinction is made between tax violations and tax evasions (fraud). 
Switzerland signed on to the amendments of the European Convention and also has a treaty with 
the Unites States, the International Judicial Aid in Penal Matters (IJAP). See Stauter, supra note 
155, at 630. 
163 See SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera ltaliana, 92 F.RD. 111 (1981). 
164 See id. 
165 See id. The bank asked its clients to waive the bank's secrecy obligation voluntarily, and when 
they agreed the sanctions against the bank were dismissed. See Stauter, supra note 155, at 630. 
166 See Stauter, supra note 155, at 630. 
167 See id. at 631. 
168 See id. 
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these agreements are only effective for government actors investigating 
criminal matters. 169 The criminal requirements of the Swiss MlAT are 
particularized, mainly because the Swiss MlAT is employed in connec-
tion with drug-trafficking and money laundering investigations. 170 Ad-
ditionally, the treaties generally exclude political, military, and tax 
offenses. 171 As seizure of assets by foreign governmen t action would fall 
under the political and military exclusions, the investigatory provisions 
contained within the treaties are outside the realm of individual private 
citizens seeking information.172 
Neither comity nor existing formal agreements, such as treaties, have 
greatly benefited individual actors. 173 They are both designed for gov-
ernment investigations rather than individual claimants. 174 Even when 
using the letters rogatory method, individual claimants seeking infor-
mation must pass the muster of the foreign judge and take their 
chances that the holder of records will provide the records needed to 
pursue the claim. 175 As noted, the potential grounds for granting an 
individual access to secret information are narrow, and even with the 
backing of a governmental agency, there are strict limitations to a 
bank's cooperation. 176 
Individuals are faced with three distinct problems. First, they have 
limited resources and have no political influence to coerce a secrecy 
jurisdiction bank to cooperate. 177 Second, the areas in which they may 
seek information are strictly regulated. 178 Third, the current banking 
laws and procedures fail to address the particular problems bank se-
crecy imparts to the individuaP79 
169 See Swiss MlAT, supra note 155; see generally Alan Ellis & Robert Pisani, The United States 
Treaties on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters: A Comparative Analysis, 19 L'IT'L LAW. 
189 (1985). 
170 See Swiss MlAT, supra note 155; The MOD is only aimed at insider trading violations; see 
also The Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, opened 
for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989). 
171 See Swiss MlAT, supra note 155, art. 2, 'n l(c)(1)-(3), (5). 
172 Read strictly, these exclusions could also bar government to government investigations. 
I73 See supra notes 136-62 and accompanying text. 
174 Notwithstanding their availability to individual actors, the lengthy process and expense make 
current methods useless. See id. 
175 See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. 
176 See id. 
177Even the efforts of diplomats could not budge the Swiss bankers. See MacCarthaigh, supra 
note 1. 
178 See supra notes 148-72 and accompanying text. 
179 See id. 
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IV. THE EXPANSION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND 
UNDERSTANDINGS FOR INVESTIGATIVE COOPERATION IN 
RECOGNITION OF UNIVERSAL CRIMES 
Bank secrecy jurisdictions such as Switzerland have bowed to the 
governmental pressure of non-secrecy jurisdictions and established 
procedures for the relaxing of their financial privacy laws.18o The indi-
vidual, however, must resort to discovery techniques and comity unless 
he can make a claim which an official agency will espouse.181 Although 
expanding the concept of a crime against humanity to encompass this 
type of economic harm would not improve the individuals ability to 
gain access, its mere recognition would provide a sense of redress. 182 
A. History of "Crimes Against Humanity" 
In November of 1945, representatives from the victorious Allied 
powers began to sit in judgment of the defeated Nazi regime.183 These 
Nuremberg Trials, which would last for several years, charged the Nazi 
defendants with: 
[c) rimes against humanity, namely murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts, commit-
ted against any civilian population before or during the war 
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds ... 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
who had perpetrated it.184 
The concept of a "crime against humanity" has never been conclusively 
defined, save the established theory that crimes against humanity were 
separate and distinct from war crimes. l85 Except for the willful destruc-
180 See id. 
181 See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 189-200 and accompanying text. 
183 See Joel Cavicchia, The Prospects fur an International Criminal Court in the 199Os, 10 DICK. J. 
INT'L L. 223, 226. (1992). 
184 See Agreement: Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis 
(including the Charter of the International Military Tribunal), Aug. 8, 1945,82 U.N.T.S. 279. 
185The French Government interpreted the phrase "crimes against humanity" to include: 
''Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all crimes and cruel treatment such as 
torture, mutilation, any kind of corporal punishment. Collective punishment, taking of hostages, 
outrages upon personal dignity, particularly humiliating and degrading treatment, extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly." See Larry Johnson, Remarks from the Symposium held at Pace University 
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tion of property, the economic rights of the individual have generally 
not been incorporated into the human rights statutes. 186 
Although the rights created are not self-enforcing, Article 17 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration), states that 
"[e]veryone has the right to own property .... No one shall be arbi-
trarily deprived of his property."187 This article comports fully with the 
original intent of the Swiss Banking Law of 1934 which was enacted to 
protect Jewish depositors from Gestapo seizures. 188 
B. Reasons for Extension 
In 1946, and in subsequent years, Switzerland cooperated with the 
Nuremberg trials and disclosed the necessary information to the tribu-
nal. I89 Notwithstanding this disclosure however, tens of thousands of 
accounts went unclaimed, and are only now undergoing a thorough 
investigation and tracing.190 
The current mutual assistance treaties and other informal agree-
ments maintained between secrecy jurisdictions and non-secrecy juris-
dictions, however, provide only for investigations that are not of a 
political or military nature. 191 Expansion of cooperation has rested with 
governmental aid in the investigation of drug trafficking and insider 
trading activities. 192 
The concept of a crime against humanity was meant to be broad and 
capable of reflecting changing societal notions of criminal activity.193 
For this reason, the treatment of the Holocaust survivors by the Swiss 
banks should also constitute a crime against humanity. Notwithstand-
ing the original intent of the banking law, the secrecy laws have now 
been used to prevent all access to funds, which the banks have been 
able to use for over 50 years. 194 In essence, a second unwarranted 
School of Law on October 23, 1993,6 PACE INT'L L. REv. 87, 89 (1994). Conspiracy to commit a 
crime against humanity was also a punishable offense. See Cavicchia, supra note 183, at 226; 
Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past 
Objections, 23 DENV.]. INT'L L. & POL'y 419, 42~7 (1995). 
186 See Statute of the International Tribunal, arts. 2(d), 3(e). 
187G.A. res. 217A (III), at 71 U.N. Doc A/810 (1948). 
188 See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. The law was also enacted to provide protection 
from prosecution for those bankers who withheld information. See id. 
189 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
190 See supra notes 37, 40-43 and accompanying text. 
191 See supra notes 153-76 and accompanying text. 
192 See id. 
193 See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text. 
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deprivation of property has occurred under the guise of protecting the 
customer. 195 And while the allegations of the Holocaust survivors are 
being painstakingly addressed, some answers will never be known be-
cause the traces are lost to the passage of time.196 
For many of the Holocaust survivors making claims, the issue is not 
one of restitution, but of apologies. 197 It has taken Switzerland over 50 
years to acknowledge its conduct during World War 11.198 Like many of 
the claimants, Estelle and Jacob are well into their seventies.199 They 
believe that they will be gone long before any accountings are com-
pleted.2°O The extension of the "crime against humanity" label would 
acknowledge this second victimization. 
V. THE PROBLEMS OF SUPERVISION AND REDRESS: THE NEED FOR 
REVISION OF BANK SECRECY LAWS 
The facts and experiences relayed from World War II suggest that 
tracing seized finances and providing reparations will be extremely 
difficult without diligence and access to objective documentation.20l As 
the recent claims of Holocaust survivors have shown, there is a need 
for a method of investigation and redress that the laws of bank secrecy 
jurisdictions do not adequately address.202 The rise of international 
crime and exploitative use of bank secrecy laws since World War II have 
caused the U.S. and other foreign governments to work together, as 
well as, with international organizations to solve mutual problems.203 
Because supervision only exists as to specific areas, such as money-laun-
dering and drug trafficking, there is room within the current structure 
of cooperation for additional supervision of bank activity. 
A. The Current System of Escheat 
Escheat is the term used to describe the reversion of property to the 
state upon the death of the owner, where no individual exists who is 
entitled to inherit the property.204 The doctrine of escheat has its origin 
195 See id. 
196 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
197 See Breaking the Code, supra note 6. 
198 See id. 
199 See MacCarthaigh, supra note l. 
200 See Breaking the Code, supra note 6. 
201 See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text. 
202 See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. 
203 See STAFF REpORT, supra note 61, at 103; Jones, supra note 56, at 48l. 
204 See, e.g., Board of Education v. Browning, 635 A.2d 373, 375 (Md. 1994). 
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in feudal notions of real property rights.205 Escheat was the interest in 
real property which reverted to the feudal lord upon failure of heirs 
of the original grantee.206 In the United States, escheated property 
passes to state governments, which have assumed the role of the sov-
ereign and take the property in trust for the citizens of the state for 
their ultimate benefit.207 Distinction is made, however, between custo-
dial taking and true escheat. 208 Custodial taking only involves the hold-
ing of dormant property until it can be returned to a rightful owner, 
while in true escheat, a final determination is made and the property 
reverts entirely to the state.209 Each state decides how long property 
may lie dormant before beginning escheat procedures.210 All states 
require some form of notice to be given to all potentially interested 
parties, usually by publication notice.211 
Under current Swiss law, however, such escheat procedures would 
confound the letter of the law, because the identity of the account 
holder would have to be disclosed to the general public for notice to 
be effective.212 In the 1960s, Swiss banks did effect custodial taking of 
certain dormant accounts believed to belong to possible Holocaust 
victims.213 Generally, however, an abandoned or dormant account is 
retained by the bank without any change in status such that would give 
potential heirs notice or provide any feasible method of tracing missing 
accounts.214 While this may be read as providing the ultimate protec-
tion for the customer's assets, in the immediate case of the Holocaust 
survivors, the secrecy laws have blocked the rightful heirs without 
redress.215 
205 See, e.g., In re Abrams, 556 N.YS.2d 925, 926-27, affd 570 N.YS.2d 468 (1990). 
206 See, e.g., State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 206 S.W.2d 771 (1947). 
207 See In re Abrams, 556 N.YS.2d at 926-27; In re Melrose Ave., 136 N.E. 235 (1922). 
208 See, e.g., Arizona v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 502 U.S. 981 (1991). 
209 See, e.g., Bank of America v. Cory, 210 Cal. Rptr. 351, 355-59 (1985). 
210 See generally K. Reed Mayo, Virginia s Acquisiticm of Unclaimed and Abandcmed Personal 
Property, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 409 (1986). 
2ll See id. 
212 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
213 See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
214 See generally CHAMBOST, supra note 29; AUBERT, SECRET BANCAIRE, supra note 29. 
215 See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Current System of Surveillance and Review 
1. The Bank for International Settlements 
In 1930, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was created 
to facilitate financial operations on the international market and to 
promote cooperation among the central banks.216 In 1974, the BIS 
founded the Committee on Bank Regulations and Supervisory Prac-
tices (Basle Committee) ,217 a standing committee whose purpose was 
to address new international bank supervision issues.218 The Basle Com-
mittee's purpose is to "strengthen ... collaboration among national 
authorities in their prudential supervision of international banking. "219 
In 1975, the Basle Committee established guidelines and non-man-
datory recommendations for central banks.220 The guidelines provided: 
1. Surveillance and supervision of foreign banks should be 
the joint responsibility of parent and host authorities. 
2. No foreign bank should be able to evade/avoid supervi-
SlOn. 
3. Ideally, international co-operation should be promoted 
by information exchanges between host and parent authori-
ties.221 
Although the BIS and Basle Committee guidelines speak to govern-
mental agencies and prosecution of crimes, they provide for an infor-
216 See James Hackney & Kim Leslie Shafer, The Regulation of International Banking: An Assess-
ment of International Institutions, 11 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 475, 486. The BIS voluntarily 
opened its records to an audit in 1997 by the Volcker Commission to examine its dealing with 
the Central Bank of Germany during World War II. See Swiss Apologize, supra note 46. 
217The Committee is comprised of the central bank and supervisory agency officials from 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Committee is known as the "Cooke 
Committee," after its chairman, Peter Cooke of the Bank of England, or as the "Basle Committee," 
after the Swiss city where the BIS is headquartered. See Hackney & Shafer, supra note 216, at 488. 
218 See Jones, supra note 56, at 481-82. 
219 See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Regulations Implementing the Bank Secrecy Act, 
and Insider Fraud on Financial Institutions: Hearings Before the SubComm. on Financial Institutions 
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 
lOOth Cong., 1st. Sess. 249 n.1 (1987) (statement of Manuel Johnson, Vice-Chairman, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
220 With all international bank policy promulgated by the Basle Committee, it was hoped that 
the establishment of guidelines among the major banking nations would force all other nations 
into line. See Jones, supra note 56, at 482. 
221 See Hackney & Shafer, supra note 216, at 489. 
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mal relationship between participating governments to obtain infor-
mation without strict formal arrangements or procedures.222 
2. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(World Bank) and the International Money Fund 
In the aftermath of World War II, the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (World Bank) was chartered at Bretton 
Woods under the auspices of the United Nations Charter to finance 
post-war reconstruction and the economic development of its mem-
bers.223 The purposes of the World Bank are (1) to assist in the recon-
struction and development of the member nations, (2) to promote 
foreign investment, and (3) to provide loans for productive purposes 
when private capital is not available. 224 Both the World Bank and the 
International Money Fund (IMF) serve, in essence, to regulate the 
economies of developing third world nations;225 the IMF by economic 
stabilization, the World Bank by providing low interest project loans.226 
In return for the loans, countries are required to follow certain pru-
dent international banking practices and procedures.227 
One of the purported reasons behind bank secrecy and financial 
privacy laws is the prevention of capital flight from developing and 
unstable countries.228 Thus, in many respects, bank secrecy is consid-
ered a prudent financial policy. For this reason, the negative aspects 
of secrecy have not been raised by either the World Bank or the IMF. 
Currently, the IMF maintains a surveillance system, but it is geared 
towards maintaining a consistent macro-economic policy, rather than 
the supervision of individual banking institutions.229 Likewise, it is un-
likely that the World Bank would adopt a policy against secrecy as a 
requirement for receiving funds, since the goal is to foster foreign 
economies.230 Yet, by expanding the authority of the IMF and World 
222 Under this informal relationship, it might be possible for an individual's government to seek 
access to banking records on behalf of its citizen. See id. 
223 SeeARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 3 (1995). Membership in the IMF is a prerequisite for joining 
the World Bank. See id. at 5. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
226 See Hackney & Shafer, supra note 216, at 476-78. 
227 See id. at 478. 
228 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
229 See JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 269 
(1995). 
230 Furthermore, loans are only made available when private capital is not available. Even if the 
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Bank to include provisions for monitoring secrecy laws and their effects 
on consumers, a system of supervision and redress could be estab-
lished. Such an extension would not contravene the policies of either 
organization, but rather would promote conscientious banking prac-
tices, both responsive to institutional and consumer banking needs. 
VI. APPRAISING THE BENEFITS OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY LAWS AND 
THE NEEDS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE: A PROPOSAL 
The collapse of BCCI and Daiwa Bank, the mounting occurrences 
of money laundering and abuses, and the personal upheaval of the 
Holocaust survivors, have highlighted the need for greater bank super-
vision and methods of redress. 231 While it is unlikely that existing 
notions and practices of financial privacy will be entirely eliminated, it 
is clear that both international and internal efforts have been focused 
on limiting the disadvantages of a secrecy jurisdiction, while attempting 
to retain the benefits.232 The most reasonable solution would be to 
create a permanent independent commission, capable of addressing 
individual and regulatory concerns, that would exist within the current 
supervisory structure.233 
A. The Creation of a Permanent Independent Review Commission for 
Regulation and Arbitration 
The existing system for obtaining information and redress rests with 
using the formal and exasperating methods of requesting disclosure. 234 
Both individual and government searches for information have been 
stymied by this process.235 By creating a permanent independent review 
committee (PIRC), the inherent problems associated with bank se-
crecy, such as procedures for dormant accounts and lack of supervision 
and redress during investigations, could be minimized. 
World Bank or IMF adopted such measures, a country wanting to keep its privacy laws could look 
elsewhere for unrestricted funding. 
231 See NORTON, supra note 229, at 247-52. 
232 One of named benefits is of customer confidence in secret accounting methods. Such 
confidence, however, must be taken in light of the current allegations against the Swiss banking 
industry and others. 
233 Many international groups are calling for the establishment of a permanent independent 
investigative committee to sort through the claims of survivors and keep an eye for potential 
future abuses. See Israe~ Jews Weigh Inquiry Into Swiss Role in WW2, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Jan. 
20, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
234 See supra notes 56-58, 66-77 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra notes 136-79 and accompanying text. 
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Currently, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reports on 
macro-state236 economic international banking activities, although it 
refrains from taking a specific position or from making formal an-
nouncements.237 The Basle Committee has taken on the task of moni-
toring bank efforts to combat international crime and has promul-
gated code of conduct guidelines for bankers and bank employees.238 
The major central banking nations are already represented in the Basle 
Committee and in the BIS. By voluntarily granting authority to the 
Basle Committee to create a PIRC for the promulgation of substantive 
procedures, the Basle Committee could create a unified approach to 
informational requests and serve as an arbiter of disputes.239 
1. Surveillance of Bank Procedures Regarding the Treatment of 
Dormant and Misappropriated Accounts 
Accounts become dormant for many reasons, including abandon-
ment, imprisonment, war, and death.24o By not allowing public notice 
when dormancy occurs, the Swiss laws implicitly assume that the estate 
(or missing customer) is better off with the funds remaining in bank 
custody and use. Similarly, the estate is better served by escheating to 
the state than relying on the possibility of finding heirs through notice. 
The desire for bank secrecy always outweighs an individual's rights. 
This pre-eminence of financial privacy, however, has been curtailed by 
the response of financial institutions to the abuses of their secrecy 
236 The BIS has been called the "Central Bank to all other Central Banks," and normally reviews 
only the actions of the nation-state, as opposed to the individual banks. See NORTON, supra note 
229, at 270. 
237 See id. 
236 See id. 
239 Because secrecy jurisdictions hold membership in the Committee, their interests will be 
represented. 
240 This list is not meant to be exhaustive. There are two types of imprisonment: pursuant to a 
criminal violation and as a political prisoner. To the extent the customer is a political prisoner, 
the divulging of secret accounts could prove dangerous or deadly to the customer. If the home 
nation is in obvious turmoil, the Swiss bankers might be justified in withholding information even 
though the account is dormant and may ultimately escheat to the state. Furthermore, Swiss banks 
could work in tandem with such international human rights organizations as Amnesty Interna-
tional by requesting a list of all known political prisoners within a certain nation, while not 
divulging the customer's name. To the extent the customer is being held under criminal laws, 
the problem of abandonment becomes even more remote. There, customer contact might be 
maintained through the privileged communications with counsel. Similar discretion might be 
afforded on account of wartime loss of contact. 
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systems by international crime.241 A similar response should be forth-
coming in the area of universal crimes.242 
Current Swiss laws protect the privacy of customers even beyond 
their death or disassociation with a bank.243 This practice need not be 
disturbed in cases of known death.244 Where there has been a voluntary 
disassociation from the bank by the customer, there is also no concern 
of overreaching bank secrecy. The practice of unrelenting secrecy, 
however, fails to continue the underlying rational of secrecy laws when 
an account is dormant for unknown reasons. 245 In such a case, public 
disclosure, by name and not by number, is the only possible and 
reasonable solution. 246 
In cases of dormancy due to death, there are two possibilities: the 
bank knows the customer is dead (with or without heirs) or the bank 
does not know the customer is dead. When there is the possibility of 
heirs, Swiss law provides an elaborate ritual for protecting the customer 
and passing on the secrecy obligations.247 To the extent that the cus-
tomer dies intestate, there may still be heirs who can pursue a claim 
under the Swiss succession laws.248 If there are no heirs, there may be 
an executor who could search for relatives without breaking the secrecy 
req uiremen ts. 249 
When an account becomes dormant for unknown reasons, the need 
for providing public notice is great, as the claims of the Holocaust 
survivors tragically illustrate. Without public notice and reasonable 
access to information, the cycle of potential injustice continues. 
241 See supra notes 153-68 and accompanying text. 
242 See supra notes 180-200 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
244 In other words, bankers know the customer is dead and the succession process is underway. 
245 Under the Decree of 1963, Swiss bankers implicitly understood that this practice would do 
further injustice to Jewish account holders believed to be victims of the Holocaust. See supra notes 
28-33 and accompanying text. 
246This author agrees that requiring notice in Swiss and last known location may not reach 
relocated survivors. This should not, however, preclude adoption of the plan since it has the real 
chance of mitigating damages to those meant to be protected. 
247 See CAMPBELL, supra note 112, at 675. 
248 See id. 
249 See id. 
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2. Promulgation of Dormancy Requirements and Procedures for 
Public Notice 
The independent commission should first address the definition of 
dormancy and then establish procedures for reporting dormant ac-
counts. To the extent there are no local escheat procedures, such as 
diligent search, custodial taking, and public notice,250 the PIRC could 
recommend appropriate ones and seek to standardize existing proce-
dures. The PIRC should require banks to notifY it of accounts dormant 
for five years or more. Notice to the PIRC would not require the 
customer's actual identity,251 but only the account number and .the 
country of last known origin.252 If the account remains dormant with-
out explanation for more than ten years, the bank would then be 
obliged to provide public notice. For secrecy jurisdictions, this presents 
particular problems. If the bank fails to contact the bank customer 
directly, notice to the general public would create an inherent conflict 
with the nation's secrecy laws. 
The Swiss law, however, was codified to provide protection of cus-
tomer assets from unlawful seizure by the Gestapo.253 This original 
intent of the secrecy laws and the integrity of the Swiss banking system, 
including modifications to the secrecy laws during criminal investiga-
tions, warrant the creation of disclosure provisions. The few grants of 
access made by Swiss banks since the enactment of the secrecy laws 
have been in reaction to allegations of a general lack of integrity of 
the banking system.254 These specialized notice requirements would 
not compromise customer expectations of bank secrecy, because banks 
will not be required to disclose any active accounts. Only accounts that 
have been dormant for more than ten years, where the bank has failed 
250 Notice would require publication in the Swiss journal and in a major newspaper of the last 
known country of customer's residence. This may be problematic given that relocation could give 
rise to the dormancy itself, but it would be unreasonable to require the Swiss banks to publish 
in every known newspaper. The hope is that even if the customer or the heirs have relocated, 
friends or relatives may be available to pass along the notice. 
251 Customers are not anonymous to a limited number of bankers with full access to the 
accounts, only to the general public and to the world at large. Criminal laws and a heavy sense 
of moral fiduciary duty keep the bankers from divulging. See supra note 92 and accompanying 
text. 
252 While technically still a violation of the secrecy laws, the withholding of a customer's identity 
maintains the primary goal of bank secrecy. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
253The law was also designed to protect the bank's employees from harassment by Gestapo 
officials. See supra notes 59-61, 85-87 and accompanying text. 
254 See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text. 
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to establish any positive contact with the customer and cannot other-
wise explain the dormancy, would be disclosed.255 The PIRC would 
merely serve to monitor a bank's procedures. 
3. Arbitration of Information Request Disputes 
Traditional methods have proven to be an ineffective means of 
gaining access to records in a secrecy jurisdiction. 256 The existing meth-
ods of comity, letters rogatory, and use of formal agreements have 
been ineffective, when requesting parties are faced with bank re-
fusal. 257 In the case of the Holocaust survivors, all diplomatic and 
traditional efforts of obtaining information failed. 258 The Swiss banks 
did not relent until faced with outcries from the "court of public 
opinion. "259 
Part of the authority of the PIRC would be to oversee the discre-
tion used by secrecy jurisdictions in connection with information re-
quests. Normal bank procedures would be followed, but where there 
is a refusal, the requesting party could ask for review by the PIRC 
to ensure that the bank's refusal was not arbitrary. In the case of 
dormant accounts, the PIRC would already be notified of an account's 
existence, thus minimizing the potential for an intrusive violation of 
secrecy laws. 
CONCLUSION 
The original intent of Swiss bankers in codifYing their secrecy prac-
tices was to protect bank customers from unwarranted asset seizure 
and criminal punishment for holding assets outside their home state. 
Unfortunately, as the facts of late have shown, secrecy laws have pro-
vided a harbor for illicit activities such as money laundering and 
drug trafficking and have kept rightful heirs and owners from their 
savings. 
The best authorities to undertake the mantle of supervisor are the 
BIS and Basle Committee. While the BIS has traditionally served as a 
clearing house for central bankers, the BIS, along with the Basle 
255 Additionally, discretion is to be provided to the bankers when there is a reasonable belief 
that disclosure of identity will harm or further endanger the customer. 
256 See supra notes 142-79 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. 
258 See supra notes 1-11, 34-37 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text. 
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Committee, has the appropriate background and the support of the 
banking community needed to effect meaningful supervision. A per-
manent independent review committee would provide the responsive-
ness and dispute resolution system needed to safeguard fully customer 
rights when there is a dormant account. 
Jennifer A. Mencken 
